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Article
[Ed. Note: The Pace Law Review will publish a rebuttal to the
following article in our Spring 1997 edition, Volume 17:2.]
The Unconstitutionality of Consolidated
Planning Boards: Interlocal Planning
Under New York Law
Albert J. Pirro, Jr.
Introduction
This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers
granted to it, would seem too apparent to have required to be en-
forced by all those arguments which its enlightened friends, while
it was depending before the people, found it necessary to urge.
That principle is now universally admitted. But the question re-
specting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually
arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system
shall exist.I
This Article will examine the nature and constitutionality
of consolidated planning boards in light of the broad powers ac-
tually granted them. The issues surrounding the constitution-
ality of consolidated planning boards begs, yet again, Chief
Justice Marshall's question respecting the extent of the power
granted to the state governments. The question is whether a
municipality may abdicate its power to regulate land within its
own boundaries by delegating it to a separate planning entity.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
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In 1926 the United States Supreme Court first recognized a
municipality's ability to enact zoning and planning regulations
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.2 Prior to the
Euclid decision, the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning
and planning regulations was not uniformly upheld in the state
courts.3 In Euclid, the issue disputed was the constitutionality
of a village ordinance which had divided the village of Euclid
into six classes of use districts, three classes of height districts,
and four classes of area districts. 4 The Supreme Court upheld
the ordinance, stating, "[a] nuisance may be merely a right
thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard. If the validity of the legislative classification for zon-
ing purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must
be allowed to control."5
By 1931, all states had authorized zoning and over 1000
municipalities had adopted zoning codes.6 Today, a municipal-
ity's power to enact zoning regulations through the proper dele-
gation of police power from the state legislature is widely
recognized as constitutional. The term "Euclidean" zoning re-
fers to classic "cookie-cutter" zoning and describes the early zon-
ing concept of separating incompatible land uses through the
establishment of fixed legislative rules that would be largely
self-administering.7 While today Euclidean zoning still pro-
vides the basic framework for the implementation of land use
controls at the local level, the modern trend is towards more
flexibility in land use planning and control.8
Nevertheless, there are limitations upon the power of a mu-
nicipality to enact zoning and planning regulations and on the
state legislatures in the delegation of that power to municipali-
ties within their boundaries. First, a municipality may only ex-
ercise such police power as the state specifically delegates to it.9
2. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. 1 RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, § 1.02(2)(1995).
4. Id. at n.21.
5. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
6. 1 ZIEGLER, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, § 1.01(3)(a) (4th
ed. 1992).
7. Id. § 1.01(3)(c).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359,
369, 285 N.E.2d 291, 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 145 (1972) ("Towns, cities and villages
lack the power to enact and enforce zoning or other land use regulations .... The
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The state, in turn, may only enact such enabling statutes as
comply with notions of equal protection and due process under
both the federal and state constitutions.10 As a result, when a
government wishes to deviate from the concept of Euclidean
zoning, it must do so without trampling upon private property
rights.
Part of the move away from the framework of Euclidean
zoning has been the implementation of consolidated or "joint"
planning boards." Over the last thirty years most state legisla-
tures have decided to delegate to the municipal corporations of
their states the power to enter into interlocal agreements for
the creation of a joint or regional planning board.12 Inclusive in
exercise of that power . . . must be founded upon a legislative delegation to so
proceed, and in the absence of such a grant will be held ultra vires and void . . . ."
(citations omitted)); Schilling v. City of Midland, 196 N.W.2d 846, 847 (Mich. 1972)
(holding that amendment which required subject property to permit construction
of a shopping center was invalid because a municipality has no inherent power of
zoning); Kohl v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Fair Lawn, 234 A.2d 385, 389
(N.J. 1967) (holding that local zoning ordinances must comply with statutory re-
quirements); Thompson v. Smith, 129 A.2d 638, 645-46 (Vt. 1957) (holding that the
power of a municipality to enact zoning regulations exists only if authority was
delegated by the state); Kelly v. City of Philadelphia, 115 A.2d 238, 243 (Pa. 1955)
("[I]n the absence of a specific legislative or constitutional grant, municipalities
have no authority to enact zoning ordinances."); Eden v. Town Planning and Zon-
ing Comm'n of the Town of Bloomfield, 89 A.2d 746, 748 (Conn. 1952) ("'[Zloning
authorities can only exercise such power as has been validly conferred upon them
by the General Assembly."'); Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. City of
Birmingham, 44 So. 2d 593 (Ala. 1950) (enjoining enforcement of zoning ordinance
prohibiting location of liquor stores because municipality has no inherent powers
to enact zoning regulations absent express statutory authorization); State ex rel.
Helseth v. Dubose, 128 So. 4, 6 (Fla. 1930) ("[Zoning] laws are restrictions on the
use of private property that can be justified only in some aspect of the police power
asserted in the interest of the public welfare, and cannot be enacted or enforced by
municipalities without specific legislative authorization therefor.").
10. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 2.02(1)-(3).
11. The Supreme Court recognized the municipal power to enact zoning regu-
lations. These regulations, however, must find their "jurisdiction in some aspect of
the police power, asserted for the public welfare." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
12. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-17-304 (Michie 1995); CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 65065.1 (West 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-31a (West 1989); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 281 (West 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.121 (Michie 1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4325 (West 1995); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 3 (West
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.354(1) (West 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 278.02786 (Michie 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:8A-3 (West 1991); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 11-1-3 (Michie 1995); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. part I, ch. 7 (1995); TEX.
LocAL Gov'T CODE ANN. § 371.001(b) (West 1995).
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the power to enter into intermunicipal agreements is the power
to create joint, regional, or county commissions on planning and
zoning. Surprisingly enough, these statutes have generated lit-
tle controversy over the years.'8
The history of regional planning in New York State shows
that the topic has generated relatively little debate.1 4 The New
York State Legislature enacted Article 5-G of the General Mu-
nicipal Law in 1960 to facilitate the cooperative activities of its
municipal corporations.15 This law (which was complemented
by Article 12-B of the General Municipal Law)1 6 delegated to
the municipalities the power to create "metropolitan, regional
or county planning boards."' 7 These boards do not have final
decision-making power, however, as the individual municipali-
ties have authority to override their recommendations or to
take action without any such recommendation.18
In 1992 the New York State Legislature passed section 284
of the Town Law, section 7-741 of the Village Law, and section
20-g of the General City Law.' 9 These provisions authorize mu-
nicipal corporations to create joint planning boards with unlim-
ited powers. 20 When it created these statutes, the legislature
13. One possible explanation for the lack of controversy over the constitution-
ality of regional boards is that they have traditionally had limited and mere advi-
sory authority and have had their powers expressly laid out in their respective
enabling statutes. In other words, the municipalities that have chosen to partici-
pate in joint planning programs have retained enough autonomy so that they still
have control over the direction of the land use in their communities.
14. For a history of regional planning in New York State, see Patricia E.
Salkin, Regional Planning in New York State: A State Rich in National Models,
Yet Weak in Overall Statewide Planning Coordination, 13 PACE LAW REV. 505
(1993).
15. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-m-p (McKinney 1986).
16. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 239-b-n.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Frampton v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals for Town of Lloyd, Ulster
County, 114 A.D.2d 670, 494 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (2d Dep't 1985) (holding that town
zoning board did not act unreasonably or irrationally so that its decision was con-
trolling); We're Associates Co. v. Bear, 35 A.D.2d 846, 847, 317 N.Y.S.2d 59, 61 (2d
Dep't 1970), affd, 28 N.Y.2d 981, 272 N.E.2d 338, 323 N.Y.S.2d 838 (N.Y. 1971)
(holding that county planning commission had no authority to veto town's change
of zone).
19. 1992 N.Y. Laws 724; N.Y. TowN LAW § 284 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW § 7-741 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKin-
ney Supp. 1994). The law also appears in N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-u (McKinney
Supp. 1995), which was created pursuant to 1993 N.Y. Laws 242, § 7.
20. 1992 N.Y. Laws 724. The statute reads:
480
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also expressly repealed former Article 5-J of the General Munic-
ipal Law.2 1 While the legislature has not expressly repealed
other limitations on the powers, functions, or creation of in-
termunicipal agreements as set forth in Articles 5-G and 12-B,
it has done so implicitly through the delegation of plenary deci-
sion-making authority to consolidated planning boards. 22
This Article will explore the constitutional dimensions of
consolidated planning boards with emphasis on the point that
joint planning boards with plenary decision-making power are
per se unconstitutional. 23 Part I examines how consolidated
planning boards may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution with particular emphasis on the
abridgment of voting rights.24
Part II focuses on the three ways that a consolidated plan-
ning board can deny due process of law under both the federal
4. Intermunicipal agreements. In addition to any other powers granted to
municipal corporations to contract with each other to undertake joint, coop-
erative agreements any municipal corporation may: (a) create a consolidated
planning board which may replace individual planning boards, if any, which
consolidated planning board shall have the powers and duties as shall be
determined by such agreement ....
Id. In plain language the statute allows for the powers of the joint board to be
determined by the terms of the agreement creating it. There are no limits to the
power that an agreement may vest in the joint planning board.
21. See 1993 N.Y. Laws 242, § 5. The repeal of Article 5-J, which contained
§ 119-z of the N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW, expressly destroyed any limitations on cooper-
ative activity. Section 119-z provided:
Nothing in this article contained shall be held to repeal, limit or modify the
jurisdiction, powers and duties of any state or local department, board, dis-
trict, commission or authority, or any public corporation, or other agency,
now or hereafter possessed . . . or to nullify, abate or otherwise affect any
rights acquired or action taken heretofore or hereafter pursuant to such de-
cision, order, license, permit, approval, or other act.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-z (McKinney 1986).
22. Examples of these implicit limitations on joint municipal power include
voting provisions for entering into such agreements (see N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW
§ 119-o(1) (McKinney 1986)) and those contained in N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 239-d
(McKinney 1986) (providing for the powers of regional boards).
23. 1992 N.Y. Laws 724. All three statutes are entitled "[i]ntermunicipal co-
operation in comprehensive planning and land use regulation." They confer broad
powers on municipalities in regard to the formation and functions ofjoint planning
boards. The express legislative intent was to promote intergovernmental coopera-
tion through the illustration of the statutory authority under Article 5-G of the
General Municipal Law to partake in intermunicipal land use regulation. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See infra part I.
1996] 481
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and New York State Constitutions.25 First, the consolidated
planning boards improperly fracture the autonomy that the sev-
eral municipalities enjoy regarding the creation and develop-
ment of their own comprehensive plans. The comprehensive
plans are necessary to promote the health, safety, and welfare
of their unique constituencies. Second, the newly enacted New
York statutes are overbroad and list no standards or guidelines
which a joint planning board must follow. Third, a consolidated
planning board may also deny due process when its enabling
statute bears no relation to the health, safety or welfare of the
community.
Part III examines how a joint planning board creates a
legal impediment since layer upon layer of planning review will
serve only to delay, prevent, or interrupt development projects
and private property rights, by creating, in effect, a de facto
moratorium on development. 26 This in turn may amount to a de
facto taking of private property. Part IV examines why the New
York statutes must be construed in the most narrow sense.27
This Article concludes that the statutes improperly dele-
gate legislative power to an entity which in the absence of regu-
lations encourage arbitrary, irrational, and capricious decision-
making. This decision-making is beyond the control of even the
electorate. In short, if municipalities wish to accomplish inter-
governmental cooperation, they can do so through means which
do not trample on the equal protection and due process rights of
their citizens.
I. The Creation of a Joint Planning Board With Final
Decision-Making Power is Per Se Unconstitutional
Because It Constitutes a Violation of Equal Protection 28
by Abridging Voting Rights
Equal protection may be denied when a joint planning
board divests the power each autonomous municipality enjoys
in deciding for themselves how they should best use the land
within their own borders. Equal protection requires that the
25. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. See discussion infra
part II.
26. See infra part III.
27. See infra part IV.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
482 [Vol. 16:477
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challenged governmental classification rest on grounds relevant
to the achievement of a valid governmental objective. Further,
the classifications must treat persons equally who are similarly
situated under the law.29 A municipality or public authority
may violate "equal protection rights . . . [through] the gross
abuse of power, invidious discrimination, or fundamentally un-
fair procedures."30 When two or more municipalities decide to
turn over their planning authority to a consolidated board, the
board's subsequent actions may violate the Equal Protection
Clause because the potential for palpably arbitrary rulings3 '
may not be cured by the electoral process.32
Consolidated planning may violate the Equal Protection
Clause in two ways. First, consolidated planning boards may
violate the "one person, one vote" principle because of the inher-
ent lack of proportional representation on consolidated plan-
ning boards.33 Second, equal protection may also be denied
because the citizens in each of the municipalities that have
formed the joint planning board are denied the right to partici-
pate in the selection process of the board members from the
other municipality.34 Fundamentally, a consolidated planning
board makes decisions affecting the use of land in both commu-
nities. The citizens of each community affected by the joint
planning board must have an equal say in its composition. Any-
thing less may create a constitutional infirmity in the statute.
29. See Gruen v. County of Suffolk, 187 A.D.2d 560, 563, 590 N.Y.S.2d 217,
219-20 (2d Dep't 1992). See also Margolis v. New York City Transit Authority, 157
A.D.2d 238, 240-41, 555 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712-13 (1st Dep't 1990); In re Cooke v. Bd. of
Ed. of the Lawrence School Dist., 528 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
30. Dean Tarry Corp. v. Friedlander, 650 F. Supp. 1544, 1552 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
affd, 826 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1987).
31. 20 N.Y. JUR.2D, Constitutional Law § 347 (1982). See also Nelson v. Los
Angeles County, 362 U.S. 1, 8 (1960); Harman v. Bd. of Ed., 300 N.Y. 21, 31, 88
N.E.2d 351, 355, reh'g denied, 300 N.Y. 644, 90 N.E.2d 297 (1949); Lapchak v.
Baker, 298 N.Y. 89, 95, 80 N.E.2d 751, 754 (1948); People v. Arlen Service Sta-
tions, Inc., 284 N.Y. 340, 343-44, 31 N.E.2d 184, 185 (1940).
32. A denial of voting rights through the implementation of a consolidated
planning board can occur two ways. Part A of this article describes how equal
protection can be denied through a violation of the principle of "one person, one
vote." Part B speaks in terms of the inherent lack of proportional representation
in the composition of joint planning boards.
33. See discussion infra part II-A.
34. See discussion infra part II-B.
1996] 483
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A. The Circumvention of the "One Person, One Vote"
Principle: Morris and its Aftermath
The members of a joint planning board would undoubtedly
be appointed by their respective town supervisors or town
boards. This effectively disenfranchises the citizens of all mu-
nicipalities involved in the intermunicipal agreement by not
complying with the "one person, one vote" doctrine.3 5 In Board
of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris,6 the United States
Supreme Court examined the important doctrine of "one person,
one vote."37 In Morris, the City of New York had created a
Board of Estimate consisting of three members elected citywide,
plus the elected presidents of New York City's five boroughs.
Obviously, the five boroughs differed greatly in the size of their
electorates so that there was unequal representation on the
Board. The Court held that this deviation from the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was per se uncon-
stitutional, stating that the equal protection guarantee of one
person, one vote "extends not only to congressional district
plans . . . but also to local government apportionment."38
35. While concededly the "one man, one vote" principle has no relevancy to
appointed offices (see Sailors v. Bd. of Ed. of the City of Kent, 387 U.S. 105 (1967);
see also Hadley v. Jr. College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd.
of Ed., 566 N.E.2d 1283 (Ill. 1990)), it is also true that a state may not manipulate
its political subdivisions so as to defeat a federally protected right. Sailors, 387
U.S. at 108. Therefore, citizens are not denied equal representation because the
appointment process of the joint planning board members is constitutionally in-
firm. Rather, equal protection is denied when the electorates of foreign municipal-
ities through the election of their own town boards and supervisors (which in turn
have the exclusive right to appoint these joint planning board representatives)
have an equal or greater right to affect land use and stifle development in land
outside the boundaries of their own municipalities. This encroachment on prop-
erty rights would be constitutionally impermissible. See United States Trust Co.
of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that though Contract Clause does
not require states "to adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute of
its sovereignty," states cannot partially repudiate financial obligation without
showing repeal was reasonable and necessary to serve an important state pur-
pose). See also Hades v. Axelrod, 70 N.Y.2d 364, 515 N.E.2d 612, 520 N.Y.S.2d 933
(1987) (noting the unconstitutionality of deprivation of vested property rights);
Fred F. Fresh Investing Co., Inc. v. City of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 687, 350 N.E.2d 381,
385 N.Y.S.2d 5, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (noting that zoning violates Due
Process if state deprives individual of property rights in one lot and permits trans-
fer of those development rights to another lot).
36. 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
37. Id. at 692.
38. Id. (citations omitted).
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss3/3
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The composition of the Board of Estimate is analogous to
that of a joint planning board, the only difference being that a
planning board's members may receive their offices through ap-
pointment rather than through election.39 A joint planning
board may not be representative of the municipalities it seeks to
regulate. The problem lies in the fact that citizens in commu-
nity "A" are unable to elect the town supervisors or town boards
who appoint members to these joint boards from other commu-
nities "B", "C" or "D". These elected officials, through the ap-
pointment process, ultimately determine land use policies in
their regions.40 Since they only have to answer to their particu-
lar constituency, the town boards or supervisors are effectively
insulated from the democratic process. 41 In Morris, Justice
White reaffirmed the notion that the right to vote is a funda-
mental right enjoyed by all citizens and, as such, the weight of
one's vote should not be lessened:
The personal right to vote is a value in itself, and a citizen is,
without more and without mathematically calculating his power
to determine the outcome of an election, shortchanged if he may
vote for only one representative when citizens in a neighboring
district, of equal population, vote for two; or to put it another way,
if he may vote for one representative and the voters in another
district half the size also elect one representative. 42
39. The only reference to the method of creation of a consolidated planning
board appears in Subdivision 4(a) which states:
In addition to any powers granted to municipalities to contract with each
other to undertake joint, cooperative agreements any municipality may: (a)
create a consolidated planning board which may replace individual planning
boards, if any, which consolidated planning board shall have the powers and
duties as shall be determined by such agreement.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-u(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
40. See Cunningham v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 751 F. Supp. 885, 888
(W.D. Wash. 1990) (holding that whether elected bodies serve an "administrative"
or "legislative" function is immaterial; municipalities must still meet requirements
of "one person, one vote.").
41. See Northampton County Drainage Dist. Number One v. Bailey, 392
S.E.2d 352 (N.C. 1990) (holding that the right to vote on equal terms is a funda-
mental right for purposes of equal protection and strict scrutiny was appropriate
in determining whether equal protection was denied because residents of county
who owned land in drainage district could not vote for clerk of superior court in
another county who appointed drainage district commissioners).
42. Morris, 489 U.S. at 698.
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The situation inherent in the concept of a consolidated planning
board is not too far off from this proposition. Through the elec-
tion of their own officials, citizens of a municipality with a
smaller population could have as much power to determine the
planning policies of a municipality with a larger population.
Because there is the danger that these citizens of the larger
community will be denied equal voting power to vote for the offi-
cials who appoint the joint planning board members, joint plan-
ning boards violate the "one person, one vote" principle. In
addition to the violation of the "one person, one vote" principle,
a joint planning board may deny a municipality and its citizens
proportional representation on the board. In Morris, Justice
White reiterated the importance of proportional representation.
Morris held that each citizen has the inalienable right to par-
ticipate in the political processes of the legislative bodies of
which he or she may be a constituent:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportu-
nity to participate in that election, and when members of an
elected body are chosen from separate districts, each district must
be established on a basis that will insure, as far as practicable,
that equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal
numbers of officials.43
It follows that a municipality that chooses to involve itself
in a joint planning board may deny its citizens equal protection
of the law, because citizens of the municipalities may not be
proportionally represented on the board. For example, if Town
A has only 1000 citizens while Town B has 2000 citizens, the
citizens of Town B are denied equal representation on the joint
board where an equal number of board members are appointed
from each town.44 This is constitutionally impermissible.45
43. Id. at 693 (quoting Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City,
397 U.S. 50 (1970)).
44. It must also be noted that there is no limit to the number of municipalities
allowed to compose a joint planning board. Section 284(1) of the Town Law pro-
vides in relevant part: "express statutory authorization for cities, towns and vil-
lages to enter into agreements to undertake comprehensive planning and land use
regulation with each other or one for the other. . . ." N.Y. TOWN LAW § 284(1) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1994). It goes without saying that the more municipalities compose
a joint planning board, the percentage of representation decreases accordingly.
45. See Board of Estimate of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). See also U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; In re Bruno v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 208
486 [Vol. 16:477
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In the creation of a joint planning board, citizens are denied
equal voting power with their vote for the town boards or mu-
nicipal supervisors, who appoint the officers of the joint plan-
ning board. In addition, in some cases they will not even be
proportionally represented on the board. When there is equal
representation between two municipalities on a joint planning
board, "the voting power of each citizen in the larger constituen-
cies is debased and the citizens in those districts have a smaller
share of representation than do those in the smaller districts." 46
When conflicts of interest arise between the municipalities, ar-
bitrary and discriminatory decisions are sure to follow. This
discrimination is even more repulsive to the Constitution under
the present statutes since joint planning boards have plenary
decision-making power.
Moreover, even where the formation of a joint planning
board gives proportional representation to the citizens of the
municipalities involved, the larger municipality would have
more voting power on the board itself. As a result, it could dom-
inate the joint planning board so that land use in the smaller
municipality could be determined by the agenda of the larger
one. 4 7 Since this "catch-22" is inherent in the concept of the
joint planning board, there may be no way to implement a joint
planning board which is not subject to constitutional attack.
B. The Absence of a Region-Wide Election for All the
Members of the Consolidated Planning Board Would
Constitute a Denial of Equal Protection
The New York State Constitution requires that "[e]very cit-
izen shall be entitled to vote at every election for all officers
elected by the people and upon all questions submitted to the
A.D.2d 877, 878, 618 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding that number of dele-
gates to a Judicial Convention did not comply with proportional representation as
required by N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 6-124 (McKinney 1978)).
46. Morris, 489 U.S. at 694.
47. While "weighted voting" has been held not to violate the Constitution (see
Curcio v. Boyle, 142 Misc. 2d 1030, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1989)), if a system of weighted voting is implemented by a joint planning board,
the potential for abuse is obvious: a minority municipality's voting power may be
so diluted that it could have no real say in the regulation of land within its own
territorial boundaries.
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vote of the people . . . ."48 The legislature has disenfranchised
the citizens of all cities, towns and villages associated with joint
planning boards. There is no democratic check on appointed of-
ficials from another municipality. Article IX section 1(b) of the
New York State Constitution deals explicitly with this situa-
tion: "All officers of every local government whose election or
appointment is not provided for by this constitution shall be
elected by the people of the local government, or of some divi-
sion thereof, or appointed by such officers of the local govern-
ment as may be provided by law."49 The joint planning board
conflicts with this fundamental constitutional precept.
Section 284 of the Town Law, section 7-741 of the Village
Law, and section 20-g of the General City Law violate this so-
called "Iblill of rights for local governments"50 since members of
a joint planning board are appointed by unelected, non-officers
of the local government, i.e., town boards and supervisors from
other municipalities. The purpose of this constitutional provi-
sion was "to secure to the people of the cities, towns and villages
of the state the right to have local offices administered by of-
ficers selected by them."5 1 When two or more municipalities
enter into an agreement to create a joint planning board, the
municipalities take away their citizens' right to have their local
offices administered by local officers that they have selected.
In addition, section 271 of the Town Law expressly autho-
rizes, pursuant to Article IX of the constitution, "the town board
of each town" to create the town's planning board.52 At least
one half of the members of a joint planning board, however, are
appointed by the town board of other towns. This also may in-
sulate these members from the democratic process.5 3
48. N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1.
49. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1, cl. b.
50. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
51. In re Alvaro v. Baar, 67 Misc. 2d 489, 491, 324 N.Y.S.2d 588, 590 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1971). See also Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 325, 183 N.E.2d
670, 674, 229 N.Y.S.2d 380, 386 (N.Y. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 901 (1962);
People v. Pelham, 215 N.Y. 374, 375, 109 N.E. 513, 514 (N.Y. 1915) (interpreting
Article 10 §2, now Article 9 §1); People ex rel. Metro. St. Ry. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax
Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 434, 67 N.E. 69, 72 (N.Y. 1903), affd, 199 U.S. 1 (1904).
52. N.Y. ToWN LAw § 271(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. CONST. art. IX.
53. See, e.g., Ryan v. Albany County Democratic Comm., 68 A.D.2d 1014, 414
N.Y.S.2d 936 (3d Dep't 1979), modified on appeal, 47 N.Y.2d 963, 393 N.E.2d 1043,
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Therefore, it is constitutionally required by Article IX and
statutorily mandated by section 271 of the Town Law that plan-
ning board members be appointed by the democratically elected
town boards of each town. Since joint planning boards will al-
ways consist of members who are not representative of the con-
stituencies they seek to regulate, they are per se
unconstitutional. Therefore, joint planning boards inherently
deny citizens notice and an opportunity to be heard in a process
that ultimately affects private property rights.
II. The Creation of a Joint Planning Board is Per Se
Unconstitutional Because It Violates Due
Process Rights
In addition to a denial of equal protection rights, joint plan-
ning boards effectively deny these citizens their due process
rights. It is a well known constitutional principle that no per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law.54
It is fundamental that the government cannot bargain
away the power to regulate property.5 5 The right to exercise the
police power cannot be alienated, surrendered or abridged by
the legislature by any grant or contract. This limitation exists
because police power is the very power by which the govern-
ment protects the rights it was designed to protect.5 6 If the re-
quirements of due process must be met when the government
attempts to interfere with individual property rights, then joint
planning boards present due process problems in three ways.
First, joint planning boards violate the doctrine of home rule by
usurping police power from an autonomous municipality with
419 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1979) (holding that the power to appoint election commissioners
must be vested in the local legislatures).
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art.
1, § 6.
55. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1976). See Ameri-
can Consumer Industries, Inc. v. City of New York, 28 A.D.2d 38, 42, 281 N.Y.S.2d
467, 473 (1st Dep't 1967). See also People v. Brooklyn Garden Apartments, Inc., 15
N.Y.S.2d 890, 258 A.D. 151 (1st Dep't 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 283 N.Y. 373,
28 N.E.2d 877 (N.Y. 1940) ("In so far as the police power means the right of the
Legislature to protect the health, general welfare and safety of the citizens such
right may not be contracted away.").
56. See People ex rel. New York Elec. Lines Co. v. Squire, 107 N.Y. 593, 606,
14 N.E. 820, 824 (N.Y. 1888), affd, 145 U.S. 175 (1892).
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the placement of that power in an unelected board.5 7 Second,
the New York statutes deny due process because they constitute
an improper delegation of police power, since the legislature set
no guidelines or rules which a joint planning board must fol-
low.58 Finally, if it is found that an enabling statute which au-
thorizes the creation of a joint planning board is not logically
related to the promotion of the welfare of the community, a de-
nial of due process results.59
A. Joint Planning Boards Are Inconsistent with the
Provisions of the New York State Constitution
Guaranteeing Due Process Because They Undermine the
Doctrine of Home Rule
The United States Supreme Court held in Euclid that:
[T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a
building of a particular kind or of a particular use, like the ques-
tion whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined,
not by an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing
considered apart, but by considering it in connection with the cir-
cumstances and the locality.6 0
The use of a joint planning board may seriously contradict the
doctrine of home rule when its members make planning deci-
sions based on the needs of the communities from which they
were appointed, not on the needs of the individual community
affected. Accordingly, a joint planning board may undermine
the doctrine of home rule.
It has been suggested that local zoning and planning auton-
omy seriously hinders regional efforts to deal with contempo-
rary problems and ignores questions of broader public
57. See discussion infra part II-A.
58. See discussion infra part II-B.
59. See discussion infra part I-C.
60. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). The prac-
tical effect of the creation of a joint planning board is that it may deny localities the
opportunity to determine their own comprehensive plans on a case by case basis.
That is, if a joint planning board becomes so large as to include representatives
from numerous localities, the board may deal solely in the abstract: it will base its
decisions on what it finds is best for the region, not for the individual citizen or for
the needs of any one particular locality.
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interest.61 For example, the New York Court of Appeals stated
in In re Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Rarnapo:62
Experience, over the last quarter century, however, with
greater technological integration and drastic shifts in population
distribution has pointed up serious defects and community auton-
omy in land use controls has come under increasing attack by
legal commentators, and students of urban problems alike, be-
cause of its pronounced insularism and its correlative role in pro-
ducing distortions in metropolitan growth patterns, and perhaps
more importantly, in crippling efforts toward regional and State-
wide problem solving, be it pollution, decent housing, or public
transportation . . . .63
Although commentators have suggested that the power of a mu-
nicipality to enact planning regulations should be deferred to
regional or even state-wide planning boards, the home rule is
exposed.64
61. 1 RoHAN, supra note 3, § 4.02(3)(c).
62. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). The court upheld a statute that required time re-
strictions on development because the restrictions were not absolute in duration.
Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155. Nevertheless, the court refused
to undermine Ramapo's authority to enact its own regulation by taking into ac-
count the effect that the timing restriction would have on the entire region's
growth. The court stated:
Recognition of communal and regional interdependence, in turn, has re-
sulted in proposals for schemes of regional and State-wide planning, in the
hope that decisions would then correspond roughly to their level of impact.
Yet, as salutary as such proposals may be, the power to zone under current
law is vested in local municipalities, and we are constrained to resolve the
issues accordingly.
Id. at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149 (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted).
63. Id. at 374, 285 N.E.2d at 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149 (citations omitted).
64. See, e.g., Robert H. Frielich and John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Timing and Se-
quential Controls-The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analy-
sis of the New Directions for Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1024-28 (1974) (exploring the urgent
need for growth control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region and analyzing the con-
stitutional problems of regulation and the methods, plans and techniques which
may be used to implement a program similar to that upheld in In re Golden v.
Planning Bd. of the Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138 (1972)). This article notes that a joint planning board may usurp home rule
only when there is a pressing regional need to do so.
Traditional approaches in land use control have concentrated decision-
making power at the local or municipal level and, perhaps secondarily, at
the county level. Only rarely has the power to control land use been exer-
15
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Article IX section 2 of the New York State Constitution sets
forth the powers and duties of the legislature as well as the
home rule powers of local governments. The general purpose of
the section is stated in Subdivision (a): "The legislature shall
provide for the creation and organization of local governments
in such manner as shall secure to them the rights, powers, priv-
ileges and immunities granted to them by this constitution." 6
Just as the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution guarantees the privileges and immunities enjoyed by
the citizens of the several states, 66 the home rule provisions of
the New York State Constitution67 guarantee certain rights to
the several municipalities within the state. One right is the
election of officials without interference from any other munici-
pality.68 The practical effect of joint planning boards is to divest
this autonomy from the municipalities.
Section 10 of the Municipal Home Rule Law is a statutory
limit on the amount of power that may be divested from any
given municipality. Section 10 states:
1. In addition to powers granted in the constitution, the statute
of local governments or in any other law, (i) every local govern-
ment shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not incon-
sistent with the provisions of the constitution or not inconsistent
with any general law relating to its property, affairs or govern-
ment . . . .69
cised by the state or a regional unit .... It is becoming increasingly appar-
ent that there are many advantages to control at a higher level over land
use problems. A number of crucial land use problems are not local in either
effect or origin, and the scope of effective regulation must be commensurate
with them. It is proving impossible to successfully regulate regional
problems with a fragmented network of controls.
Id. at 1024-25 (footnotes omitted). Under the New York statutes, however, a con-
solidated planning board may act unilaterally in decisions that are purely local in
nature since they may serve as replacements for individual planning boards. See
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g(4)(g) (McKinney 1996); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741(4)(b)
(McKinney 1996); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 284(4)(b) (McKinney 1996).
65. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(a).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)-(e).
68. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(b). "All officers of every local government
whose election or appointment is not provided for by this constitution shall be
elected by the people of the local government or by some division thereof, or ap-
pointed by such officers of the local government as may be provided by law." Id.
69. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
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Under this provision, the delegation of power to a joint planning
board, which is violative of both the United States and the New
York State Constitutions, disrupts the doctrine of home rule.70
Joint planning boards deny due process in that they unconstitu-
tionally destroy a municipality's right to choose its own officers
and regulate its own land without undue interference from any
other governmental entity.7 '
People v. Village of Pelham72 illustrates the intent of Article
IX. The Court of Appeals held in Pelham that the Westchester
County Tax Act73 was inconsistent with the doctrine of Home
Rule, which protected the autonomy of the towns and villages,
even before it was codified by the various versions of the Consti-
tution. 74 The Court, referring to the Home Rule doctrine, stated
that:
Faithfully observed, and effect given to it in its spirit as well as in
its letter, it effectually secures to each of the governmental divi-
sions of the State the right of choosing or appointing its own local
officers, without let or hindrance from the State government, and
none can be deprived of the rights and franchises thus guaranteed
to all. The theory of the Constitution is, that the several counties,
cities, towns and villages are, of right, entitled to choose whom
they will have to rule over them; and that this right cannot be
taken from them and the electors and inhabitants disen-
franchised by any act of the legislature, or of any or all of the de-
partments of the State government combined.75
The Pelham court's reasoning is still relevant. The Constitution
protects the principle that local rule may not be usurped by any
act of the State Legislature. 76 The creation of joint planning
boards is per se unconstitutional because these boards divest
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend V; N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1;
N.Y. CONST. art. IX.
71. See 8 Op. N.Y. Comp. 50 (1984) (holding that while a town and a village
within the town may enact the same substantive zoning regulations, a town and a
village may not extend the territorial application and effect of a town zoning ordi-
nance or local law into the village pursuant to an agreement under General Munic-
ipal Law article 5-G).
72. 215 N.Y. 374, 109 N.E. 513 (N.Y. 1915).
73. 1914 N.Y. Laws 510.
74. 215 N.Y. at 379-89, 109 N.E. at 514-16.
75. Id. at 515 (quoting People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson, 55 N.Y. 50, 56
(1873)).
76. 215 N.Y. at 387-89, 109 N.E. at 517 (1915).
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the local autonomy of municipalities to regulate property lo-
cated within their boundaries by fracturing the decision-making
authority among other foreign political subdivisions which may,
or may not, have a stake in each decision."7
B. The Aforementioned Provisions of the Town Law, Village
Law and General City Law Deny Due Process Through
the Improper Delegation of Discretionary Power to the
Municipalities By Not Setting Specific Guidelines, Rules
or Regulations which the Joint Planning Boards Must
Follow
It is well settled "that the lawmaking authority of a munici-
pal corporation, a political subdivision of the State, can be exer-
cised only to the extent that it has been delegated by the
State."78 Furthermore, a municipal corporation may not dele-
gate to its own agencies powers that it does not enjoy itself.79
The issue in interpreting sections 284 of the Town Law, 7-741 of
the Village Law, and 20-g of the General City Law is the
amount of power an entirely ambiguous statute can delegate.80
77. The reasoning in Pelham is still followed today. See, e.g., Matter of Roth v.
Cuevas, 158 Misc. 2d 238, 242, 603 N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1993), affd, 197 A.D.2d 369, 603 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep't 1993), affd, 82 N.Y.2d
791, 624 N.E.2d 689, 604 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1993). "The purpose of home rule provi-
sions of the Constitution is to secure the right of cities to choose their officers with-
out hindrance from the State and to preserve their privilege of continuing to
administer those powers of self-government which they enjoyed before the adop-
tion of the Constitution . . . ." Id. Other states have also followed the New York
court. See, e.g., Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 321-22 (Fla. 1930) (holding that
even though a county is a mere agency of the state having no inherent powers, its
existence as a local government is recognized by the Constitution); State ex rel. Tax
Comm'n v. Redd, 6 P.2d 619, 622-23 (Wash. 1932) (holding that the legislature
cannot take away the right of self-government from the citizens of municipal
corporations).
78. See Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372,
376, 546 N.E.2d 920, 921, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (1989).
79. See, e.g., Webster Assoc. v. Town of Webster, 112 Misc. 2d 396, 405, 447
N.Y.S.2d 401, 407 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1981), affd, 85 A.D.2d 882, 446
N.Y.S.2d 955 (4th Dep't 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 59 N.Y.2d 220, 451 N.E.2d
189, 464 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1983). "The authority of a town to enact zoning and plan-
ning legislation is purely statutory, and a town may not delegate that power be-
yond the measure granted by the Legislature." Id.
80. See, e.g., Foss v. City of Rochester, 104 A.D.2d 99, 103, 481 N.Y.S.2d 191,
194 (4th Dep't 1984), rearg. ordered, 64 N.Y.2d 993, 478 N.E.2d 203, 489 N.Y.S.2d
62, aff'd as modified, 65 N.Y.2d 247, 480 N.E.2d 717, 491 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985)
(holding that due process requires at least a reasonable degree of certainty because
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss3/3
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These statutes offer no guidance regarding the powers or
functions of joint planning boards.81 They simply read:
In addition to any other general or special powers vested in a
town to prepare a comprehensive plan and enact and administer
land use regulations, by local law or ordinance, rule or regulation,
each town is hereby authorized to enter into, amend, cancel and
terminate agreements with any other municipality or municipali-
ties to undertake all or a portion of such powers, functions and
duties.8 2
The statutes' definition of "powers," "functions" and "duties" is
rather vague: it seems that the police power to enact planning
and zoning regulations may now be delegated to a joint plan-
ning board. Invariably this includes final decision-making
power.
In addition, the statutes define "intermunicipal agree-
ments" in subdivision (4) as allowing municipalities to form a
joint planning board.83 Section 3(a) of McKinney's New York
citizens may be denied notice and an opportunity to be heard by being forced to
guess at the meaning of the statutory terms).
81. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. TOWN
LAW § 284(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §7-741(5)(a) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1994). The language of Subdivision 5(a) is a prime example of this
vagueness: "5. Special considerations. (a) Making joint agreements. Any agree-
ment made pursuant to the provisions of this section may contain provisions as the
parties deem to be appropriate . . . ." Id. Absent clear legislative guidance, this
standard becomes wholly subjective and, therefore, an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power.
82. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 284(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 7-741(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g(2)(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
83. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g(4) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 284(4) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741(4) (McKinney Supp.
1994). Subdivision (2)(b) defines certain "functions"; however, the statute reads:
"Such functions may include but are not limited to... ." N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-
g(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 284(2)(b) (McKinney Supp.
1994); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
In addition, the language of Subdivision (4)(a) greatly expands the definition of
"intermunicipal agreement": "[W]hich consolidated planning board shall have the
powers and duties as shall be determined by such agreement." In other words, the
legislature has left the authority to determine the scope of power afforded to their
joint planning boards up to the discretion of each municipality. This is therefore
an improper delegation of legislative power and a potential denial of due process.
See, e.g., Auerbach v. Kinley, 594 F. Supp. 1503, 1511 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd in
part sub nom. Auerbach v. Rettaliata, 765 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
"statutes which fail to provide [sufficiently precise] standards are unconstitutional
19
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Statutes provides in relevant part: "It is said that if a law is
perfect, final, and decisive in all its parts, and the discretion
given only relates to its execution, it is a proper delegation of
lawmaking power, otherwise it is not."8 4 In addition, state law
requires that: "[I]n conferring discretion upon administrative
officers or boards, the statute must define the limits of that dis-
cretion and fix rules or standards to govern its exercise."85
The power conferred on planning boards and administra-
tive bodies of review must be specific. It must have guidelines.8 6
The limits of administrative discretion must be clearly articu-
lated by the formulation of guidelines for the board or agency
determinations.87
A comparison of sections 274-a and 284 of the Town Law
demonstrates how section 284 constitutes an improper delega-
tion of power to the municipalities. Section 274-a of the Town
Law gives towns a measure of discretion in the authorization of
their planning boards to approve site plans and certain uses.88
Nevertheless, section 274-a defines the limits of these potential
functions. Subdivision (1)(a) is a relevant example:
Planning board approval of site plans. The town board may, as
part of a zoning ordinance . . . authorize the planning board to
review and approve, approve with modifications or disapprove site
plans . . . . Such ordinance or local law shall specify the uses for
which such approval shall be required and the elements to be in-
cluded in such plans submitted for approval; such elements may
include, where appropriate, those relating to parking, means of
access, screening, signs, landscaping,... and such other elements
because they permit local officials unlimited discretion in the area of constitution-
ally protected rights and invite arbitrary and discriminatory inferences .
84. N.Y. STATUTEs LAw § 3(a) (McKinney 1971).
85. N.Y. STATUTES LAw § 3(d) (McKinney 1971) (governing guideposts and
standards in the delegation of legislative powers). See also People ex rel. Tipaldo v.
Morehead, 270 N.Y. 233, 200 N.E. 799 (1936), cert. granted Morehead v. People ex
rel. Tipaldo, 297 U.S. 702, affd, 298 U.S. 587, reh'g denied, 299 U.S. 619 (1936)
(holding minimum wage law for women and minors unconstitutional as an unwar-
ranted delegation of legislative power to an administrative board as applied to
adult women).
86. Olp v. Town of Brighton, 173 Misc. 1079, 1082, 19 N.Y.S.2d 546, 550 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1940).
87. Id.
88. N.Y. ToWN LAw § 274-a (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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as may reasonably be related to the health, safety and general
welfare of the community.8 9
The words "such elements may include" are not followed by the
vague disclaimer "but are not limited to." Concededly, the legis-
lature still used the arguably vague phrase "may include."
However, the inclusions listed in the statute are examples of
common issues relating to a site plan review and are reasonably
related to the health, safety and general welfare of the commu-
nity. In addition, a strict reading of this statute90 shows that
the enumerated list of regulated uses serves as more than a
mere guideline which a planning board should follow. By using
the words "may include," the legislature arguably intended to
grant specific permission in the regulation of a particular list of
enumerated elements. "May" is therefore seen as permissive in
its most narrow sense.
Sections 284, 7-741, and 20-g, however, do use the qualifi-
cation "but are not limited to" after the phrase "may include."9 1
The statutes do not list any of the class of elements as set forth
in section 274-a. Significantly, there is no mention of the
health, safety or general welfare of the community.92 Therefore
no limits are set. No standards or guidelines for the exercise of
legislative discretion is set forth. This constitutes an improper
delegation of legislative authority.93
It is no surprise that the concise and specific Section 274-a
was held to be a proper delegation in Webster Associates v.
Town of Webster.94 While the Webster court held that section
274-a properly delegated final decision-making power to the
planning board, the court acknowledged that if the wording in
the statute had given absolute power to the planning board, it
would have been invalid.
89. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a(1)(a) (McKinney 1994); 1976 N.Y. Laws 272, § 2.
90. See discussion infra part IV (discussing that statutes in derogation of the
common law must receive a strict construction).
91. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §20-g(2)(b); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 284(2)(b); N.Y. VILLAGE
LAW §7-741(2)(b).
92. See infra part II.C.
93. See 25 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Counties, Towns, and Municipal Corporations § 167
(1982).
94. 112 Misc. 2d 396, 447 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County), affld, 85
A.D.2d 882, 446 N.Y.S.2d 955 (4th Dep't 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 59 N.Y.2d
220, 451 N.E.2d 189, 464 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1983).
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Moreover, even if the ordinance were to make planning board ap-
proval of a preliminary development plan an absolute prerequi-
site to further action by the town board, there would be a serious
question as to its validity. The authority of a town to enact zoning
and planning legislation is purely statutory, and a town may not
delegate that power beyond the measure granted by the Legisla-
ture . . .. While section 274-a of the Town Law permits a town
board to delegate to its planning board the approval of site plans,
it does not permit the abdication of its legislative authority to de-
termine the appropriateness of proposed rezoning . . .9
In the absence of definition, section 284 may not delegate all
legislative authority to the planning board. A joint planning
board may now usurp all authority from the towns boards. Be-
cause the members of the joint planning board are insulated
from the democratic process, no check on their power exists.
Further, a gross denial of due process arises from the statutes'
ambiguity, i.e., they set no limit with regard to the decision-
making authority of the joint planning boards.9 6
C. The Aforementioned Provisions of the Town Law, Village
Law and General City Law Constitute a Denial of Due
Process in that They Do Not Relate to the Promotion of
Health, Safety and General Welfare of the Communities
It is well settled that the New York Legislature may dele-
gate broad police powers to the municipalities. There must,
however, "be some fair, just, and reasonable connection between
the exercise of the police power and the promotion of the health,
95. Webster Assoc., 112 Misc. 2d at 405, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
96. See also Noyes v. Erie & Wyoming Farmers Coop. Corp., 281 N.Y. 187, 22
N.E.2d 334 (1939) (holding that there was no invalid delegation of legislative
power since the statute in question, which authorized a commissioner to fix milk
prices, specifically provided the manner in which the commissioner must act and
the matters he must consider as to the basis for his determination); Janiak v.
Town of Grenville, 203 A.D.2d 329, 610 N.Y.S.2d 286 (2d Dep't 1994); Timber Point
Homes, Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 155 A.D.2d 671, 548 N.Y.S.2d 250 (2d Dep't 1989)
(holding that a regulation permitting county health commissioner to grant vari-
ance was impermissibly vague and violated due process by giving unfettered dis-
cretion); Atlantic-Inland, Inc. v. Town of Union, 126 Misc. 2d 509, 483 N.Y.S.2d
612 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1984) (holding ordinance constitutionally infirm in
purporting to delegate the exercise of police powers of town and right to establish
and collect fees for exercise of such power, and in failing to fix the standard of
reasonableness, or any standard, for fees to be paid).
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comfort, safety, and [general] welfare of society."97 Sections
284 of the Town Law, 7-741 of the Village Law, and 20-g of the
General City Law state the legislative intent of increasing coor-
dination and effectiveness of planning and land use regula-
tion.98 However, the statutes make no reference to the
promotion of the health, safety, and welfare of the community.99
As such, they improperly delegate police power to the munici-
palities by not requiring a reasonable connection to the promo-
tion of health, safety and welfare. Absent this important check
on police power, the potential for abuse is obvious: a joint plan-
ning board may make its decisions based solely on the whims of
its members.
In Fenster v. Leary, the Court of Appeals quoted the astute
observation of Judge Fuld:
The police power is "very broad and comprehensive" and in its ex-
ercise "the conduct of an individual and the use of property may
be regulated so as to interfere, to some extent, with the freedom of
the one and the enjoyment of the other,". . . . But, in order for an
exercise of police power to be valid, there must be "some fair, just
97. 20 N.Y. Jun. 2D, Counties, Towns, and Municipal Corporations § 217. See
also Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 314, 229 N.E.2d 426, 429 282 N.Y.S.2d 739,
743-44 (1967) (noting the requirement that there must be a reasonable connection
between the police power "and the promotion of the health, comfort, safety, and
welfare of society." (quoting People v. Bunis, 9 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 172 N.E.2d 273, 274,
210 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 (1961))); People v. Pace, 111 Misc. 2d 488, 490, 444 N.Y.S.2d
529, 531 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1981) (holding that the state has a legitimate
interest in supervising defendant's business, which had been pervasively regu-
lated, since there was a "reasonable connection" to the promotion of the health,
safety, and welfare of the community); Gannett Co. v. Rochester, 69 Misc. 2d 619,
330 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1972) (invalidating ordinance that re-
stricted the use of newspaper vending machines as not designed to promote the
health, safety, or welfare of the community and any presumption of validity must
be balanced by preferred place given to freedoms in democratic system of govern-
ment); 1 Rathkopf, supra note 6, § 3.01(1) ("As a matter of'fundamental fairness,'
due process requires that legislative enactments be reasonably related to promot-
ing some legitimate public purpose-defined to include health, safety, morals, or
the general welfare. Ordinances which lack this 'rational basis' in fact or logic are
held unconstitutional as arbitrary and unreasonable restraints on private
rights.").
98. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 284(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741(1) (McKinney Supp.
1994).
99. Id.
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and reasonable connection" between it and the promotion of the
health, comfort, safety and welfare of society.' 00
The pivotal issue is whether the New York State Legislature
has conferred power to the municipalities (and whether the mu-
nicipalities may in turn confer power to a joint planning board)
on the ground that the public health, safety, or general welfare
will be promoted through the creation of these cooperative
boards.' 0
While a legitimate public purpose may be served without
regard to the constitutional limitations of due process and equal
protection, municipalities are not allowed to abuse the police
power and hide behind a presumption of legality by vague refer-
ences to alleged safety hazards. 0 2 There is no rational relation-
ship between the creation of joint planning boards and the
promotion of the health, safety and welfare of the several mu-
nicipalities. There are no checks on the joint planning board,
and there are no reasonable guideposts which it must follow.
The deliberation of a joint planning board will cost the taxpay-
ers and private property owners time and money in the develop-
ment of their municipalities, and the conflicts of interest
between the comprehensive plans of the several municipalities
100. Fenster, 20 N.Y.2d at 314, 229 N.E.2d at 429, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 743-44
(quoting People v. Bunis, 9 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 172 N.E.2d 273, 274, 210 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507
(1961)). See also, Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1577 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (holding vagrancy statute unconstitutional as overbroad and violative of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
101. See Olp v. Town of Brighton, 173 Misc. 1079, 1081, 19 N.Y.S.2d 546, 550
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1940), affd, 262 A.D. 944, 29 N.Y.S.2d 956 (4th Dep't
1941). In Olp, the New York Supreme Court, Monroe County, stated:
The pivotal issue in this proceeding is whether the town board as the legis-
lative body of the town has conferred power on the planning board to grant
or deny a permit for a gasoline station on the ground that the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare will be promoted or obstructed and
whether, if such power has been conferred, it is an improper delegation of
legislative authority.
173 Misc. at 1081, 19 N.Y.S.2d at 550. If two or more towns confer unlimited
power on a joint planning board, that delegation of power will be ultra vires and
void. Id. Because the statutes permit this unhindered delegation of power, the
floodgates of litigation may open.
102. 25 N.Y. JuR. 2D, Counties, Towns, and Municipal Corporations, § 220
(1982).
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will cause disruption, confusion, and will ultimately lead to ar-
bitrary and capricious decisions. 03
In their article demonstrating the need for regional plan-
ning in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region, Freilich and Ragsdale
set forth the three constitutionally permissible means by which
a region-wide planning commission may augment its power.1 0 4
First, the commission may influence patterns of growth through
regional capital improvement plans and projects. 0 Second, it
may enter into cooperation agreements with governmental enti-
ties in the region. 06 Last, it may attempt to use its powers of
review over federal grants and loans to force compliance with
the regional plan. 07 The authors note, however, that "[lDocal
governments must remain the essential link in the process, re-
taining decision-making powers at the implementation stage of
the planning process."108 This limitation simply does not exist
in the New York statutes. In short, there are other more ra-
tional means for the promotion of cooperation among the locali-
ties than through the creation of an entity which serves to
obstruct rather than promote the health, welfare, and safety of
the communities.109
103. The legislature's intent in enacting 1992 N.Y. Laws 724 was to promote
intergovernmental cooperation so as to preserve revenues, protect resources, and
coordinate land regulation. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g(1) (McKinney Supp.
1994); N.Y. ToWN LAW § 284(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
741(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994). Nevertheless, all three of these intentions cannot
come about through the use of a joint planning board. First, business will suffer
because of the delays that will occur in development, so revenue will ultimately be
lost. Second, there is no evidence that the use of a consolidated planning board
will help to preserve natural resources. Last, the goal of uniform land regulation is
illegitimate since it deprives the municipalities of the power to determine their
own comprehensive plan which can only address the particular concerns of its con-
stituents. It is no coincidence that nowhere in the language of the statutes is there
a mention of health, safety, or welfare.
104. Freilich, supra note 64, at 1022-23.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1023-24.
109. This is not to suggest that the statutes are merely subject to the "reason-
ably related" standard as set forth in Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 41
N.Y.2d 7, 11-12, 359 N.E.2d 337, 341, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (1976) (holding that a
municipal ordinance may not be arbitrary and must be reasonably related, in this
case, to the public purpose or protecting the environment). The court held, how-
ever, that if an ordinance was merely reasonably related to some "manifest evil,"
then it will be struck down as unconstitutional. Id. at 11, 359 N.E.2d at 341, 390
25
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III. The Creation of a Joint Planning Board Will, In Effect,
Constitute a De Facto Moratorium on Development
Rights Which Will Rise to the Level of a De
Facto Taking
"Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take [pri-
vate] property for 'public use' without the owner's consent."110
The United States Constitution provides that a sovereign may
not take private property without paying just compensation to
the individual landowner.'11 As a result, all states have enacted
statutes which set forth formal appropriation procedures which
must be followed so as to protect private property owners.112
The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the taking of private
property; it merely requires that just compensation be paid if
property is taken."13
A taking requiring just compensation may occur even when
a sovereign does not use the statutorily required appropriation
N.Y.S.2d at 830. See also Town of Gardiner v. Stanley Orchards, Inc., 105 Misc. 2d
460, 432 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1980). Rather, because the statutes
seek to abridge the vested rights of property owners through the denial of due
process and equal protection of law without the constitutionally required justifica-
tion that the statutes promote the health and welfare of the communities, the
strictest scrutiny must apply. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Esler v. Walters,
56 N.Y.2d 306, 310, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 1092, 452 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (1982) (stating
that equal protection guarantee of Fourteenth Amendment places heavy burden on
state to justify any departure from "one person, one vote" principle). Among some
other more reasonable means to promote intermunicipal cooperation available to
the legislature are specifying that joint planning boards can merely act in an advi-
sory capacity and mandating annual county or regional conventions of town plan-
ning boards to discuss and compare comprehensive plans.
110. 1 Nichols' ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 1.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1995).
111. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
112. See, e.g., Seiler v. Intrastate Gathering Corp., 730 S.W.2d 133, 136-37
(Tex. 1987) (holding that eminent domain procedures must be strictly followed);
State ex rel. Mo. Highway and Transp. Comm'n v. Anderson, 735 S.W.2d 350, 352
(Mo. 1987) (stating that two-step process for condemnation guarantees public early
commencement of project while preserving to individual landowners the right to
extensively and thoroughly litigate all issues relating to damages for taking);
Smith v. Penn. Cent. Corp., 499 N.E.2d 325 (Ohio 1985) (holding that in appropria-
tion of real property, Director of Transportation has option to proceed under either
of two eminent domain statutes).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Schertel v. Rex, 764 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D.
Pa. 1991); Friel v. Triangle Oil Co., 543 A.2d 863, 867 (Md. 1988); Palughi v. City
of Mobile, 526 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 855 (1988) (stating
"[p]rivate property may be condemned if it is being taken for a recognized public
use, and the owner is compensated for his loss."). Id. (citing Nicrosi v. City of
Montgomery, 406 So. 2d 951 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981)).
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proceeding. 1 14 Such taking of property without proper appropri-
ation proceedings is known as a "de facto appropriation." 115 A
de facto taking has occurred if there has been a "physical inva-
sion of property or a direct legal restraint on its use."116 If a
statute affects the free use and enjoyment of one's real property
or the power of disposition at the owner's will, a de facto taking
has occurred.117
In First English Lutheran Church v. The County of Los An-
geles,118 the United States Supreme Court recognized that a
municipal corporation may be required to compensate its citi-
zens for a temporary de facto taking."19 In response to the flood-
ing of a canyon, the County of Los Angeles adopted an interim
ordinance which prohibited the construction, reconstruction,
placement, or enlargement of any building or structure located
within the flood protection area.120 Chief Justice Rehnquist
held that "'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a landowner
all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent
takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensa-
tion."121 The Supreme Court stated in First English that:
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen
to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners
and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting
114. See Van Voorhis v. State, 21 Misc. 2d 86, 197 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Ct. Cl. 1960);
Meloon Bronze Foundry, Inc. v. State, 8 Misc. 2d 286, 166 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Ct. Cl.
1957), rev'd on other grounds, 6 A.D.2d 993, 176 N.Y.S.2d 452 (4th Dep't 1958);
Porter v. State, 5 Misc. 2d 28, 159 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Ct. Cl. 1957); Queensboro Farm
Prods., Inc. v. State, 6 Misc. 2d 445, 161 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Ct. Cl. 1956), affd, 5 A.D.2d
967, 171 N.Y.S.2d 646 (4th Dep't 1958), affd, 5 N.Y.2d 977, 157 N.E.2d 719, 184
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1959).
115. 51 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Eminent Domain, § 80 (1986). New York Courts have
long recognized that a taking that requires just compensation may occur without a
formal appropriation proceeding.
116. 51 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Eminent Domain, § 81 (1986). See also City of Buffalo v.
J.W. Clement Co., Inc., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 253, 269 N.E.2d 895, 902, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345,
355 (1971) (stating "it has long been recognized by the courts of this State that the
constitutional provision against the taking of property without just compensation
may be violated without a physical taking.") Id.
117. 51 N.Y. JuR. 2D, Eminent Domain, § 81 (1986).
118. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
119. First English, 482 U.S. 304. See also Seawall Assocs. v. City of N.Y., 74
N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976
(1989) (following First English).
120. First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
121. Id. at 318.
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land-use regulations. But such consequences necessarily flow
from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right; many
of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit the flex-
ibility and freedom of governmental authorities, and the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them.122
The use of consolidated planning boards may fall into the
category of a de facto taking. While it has been held that mere
interference with trade or business is not compensable under
the Fifth Amendment,1 23 the use of joint planning boards may
create a de facto building moratorium because municipalities
are authorized to create another layer of planning review with
unlimited decision-making authority. This extra layer of review
may freeze land development for an indefinite amount of
time.1 2 4 Building moratoria are interim controls on the use of
land which seek to maintain the status quo with regard to land
development in an area by either "freezing existing land uses or
by allowing the issuance of building permits for only certain
land uses that would be consistent with a contemplated zoning
plan or zoning change."1 2 5 These moratoria will be deemed de
facto takings, which require compensation, when they tempo-
rarily deny a property owner all reasonable use of his land, are
not limited as to time, and do not further a significant public
purpose.1 26
122. Id. at 321.
123. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 715
F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (holding that consequential damages in form of
frustration or destruction of contracts are not compensable under the Takings
Clause).
124. Municipalities under the present statutes may grant to their joint plan-
ning board any authority that their individual planning boards already have. 1992
N.Y. Laws 724. What the statutes fail to take into account, however, is the myriad
of factors that will go into a joint planning board's decision-making process when it
is composed of representatives of several municipalities. For example, when a dis-
pute arises between the members on the board over the approval of a development
project, unnecessary delay will result in a building moratorium until it can be de-
cided which municipality's comprehensive plan will apply to the project in ques-
tion. This extra layer of committee review and approval is unnecessary since final
decision-making authority should rest in the individual municipalities themselves.
125. 1 ZEIGLER, supra note 6, § 11.01(3).
126. Id. § 11.09(1)(3). See also In re West Lane Properties v. Lombardi, 139
A.D.2d 748, 749, 527 N.Y.S.2d 498, 499 (2d Dep't 1988) (holding an express ninety
day moratorium reasonable in light of the circumstances).
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While courts have recognized that a temporary restraint of
beneficial enjoyment of a parcel of land by a municipality to pro-
mote the ultimate good of the municipality as a whole, or of an
immediate neighborhood, is a valid exercise of police power, 127 a
"prolonged and continued procrastination and unreasonable de-
lay on the part of the municipality .. . might well ripen into an
unconscionable and unconstitutional 'taking' of [private]
property." 128
Intergovernmental cooperation may, in fact, relate to the
promotion of the public's health, safety, and welfare. 129 How-
ever, the use of a consolidated planning board may not further
the promotion of the health, safety, or welfare of the communi-
ties it seeks to regulate because it may ultimately cause sub-
stantial loss in revenue by delaying development. 130
It is an unquestionable advantage for municipalities to
combine their resources so as to deal effectively with many of
today's land use problems. Some of these problems include air
and water quality, suburban sprawl, and the "need for fair and
efficient allocation of available space among competing de-
mands." 131 Among the numerous reasons cited in the imple-
mentation of inter-local agreements are: potential cost savings,
more efficient use of volunteers, enhanced educational opportu-
nities, greater consistency with regional or county partnerships,
and "rational resource protection and economic development ef-
forts which reflect extra-municipal boundaries." 13 2 Indeed, it
would be beneficial if two or more municipalities combined so as
to promote these objectives.133 Nevertheless, the New York
127. See Westwood Estates v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 428-29,
244 N.E.2d 700, 702-03, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133 (1969). See also Grisor, S.A. v. City
of New York, 83 Misc. 2d 1054, 1057, 374 N.Y.S.2d 549, 552 (Sup. Ct. Richmond
County 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 54 A.D.2d 685, 387 N.Y.S.2d 271 (2d Dep't
1976) (holding that mapping of land which temporarily restrained private owner's
enjoyment thereof was a valid exercise of police power since it was designed to
promote the public good).
128. Grisor, 83 Misc. 2d at 1058, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
129. Inter-local cooperation may in fact save valuable resources, provide fur-
ther insights and wisdom by pooling distinct ideas and plans, and promote lasting
relationships between municipalities.
130. See discussion supra part II-C.
131. 1 ROHAN, supra note 3, § 33.01(1)(a).
132. Id. § 33.01(1)(b)(ii).
133. For some good examples of regional planning commissions that delayed
development for legitimate reasons, see Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d
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statutes bear no relation to these legitimate objectives and al-
low for the creation of consolidated planning boards on
whatever pretense. As a result, a joint planning board's actions
may have no rational relation to the general welfare whatso-
ever, serving only to delay development through an unreasona-
ble deliberation on regional planning issues that may have no
bearing on the individual municipality.
IV. Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law Receive a
Strict Constructionl34
It is a settled rule of law that statutes restricting the use of
land, being in derogation of the common law, must be narrowly
construed.135 As a result, the aforementioned provisions of the
Town Law, Village Law and General City Law must be con-
strued to mean that the joint planning boards may only act in
an advisory capacity, may not have any decision-making power,
and may not take into account the private interests of nonresi-
dent landowners since any other construction would be uncon-
stitutional and violative of the common law of the State of New
York.
A municipality does not have the power to impose its own
zoning regulations upon lands outside its territorial limits.136
490, 362 N.E.2d 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1977) (holding that regional control over
the Adirondack Park region was not invalid as encroaching on the planning powers
of local governments because the matter of the preservation of the Park was of
state-wide concern); CAL. GoVT CODE § 66610 (West 1983) (defining the San Fran-
cisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission); Navajo Terminals, Inc. v.
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 120 Cal. Rptr. 108 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975) (holding that while "an undue restriction on the use of private property
is as much a taking for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it,"
the adoption of a resolution that fixed and established water-oriented priority land
uses did not impose an undue restriction). Id. (quoting Candlestick Properties, Inc.
v. San Fransisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1970)).
134. N.Y. STATUTES LAw § 301(a) (McKinney 1971).
135. FGL & L Property Corp. v. City of Rye, 66 N.Y.2d 111, 115, 485 N.E.2d
986, 988-89, 495 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323-24 (1985); Vezza v. Bauman, 192 A.D.2d 712,
713, 597 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419, (2d Dep't 1993); In re Hess Realty Corp. v. Planning
Comm'n, 198 A.D.2d 588, 589, 603 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96 (3d Dep't 1993).
136. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 145 A.D.2d 487, 535
N.Y.S.2d 636 (2d Dep't 1988) (holding that Town of Dobbs Ferry had no jurisdic-
tion to force Village of Hastings-On-Hudson to accept construction of an oversized
structure on a lot bordering the two municipalities and that was substandard
under the latter's zoning ordinances); In re Siegel v. Tange, 61 A.D.2d 57, 59-60,
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As a result, sections 20-g of the General City Law, 284 of the
Town Law, and 7-741 of the Village Law may not be extended so
broadly as to give plenary power to one municipality over the
land located within another. While a municipality may take
into account considerations of adjacent land in adopting its own
zoning and planning regulations, such consideration is not
mandated.137
It is useful to review statutes from other jurisdictions deal-
ing with intergovernmental cooperation. While no other juris-
diction has a statute that expressly mentions the power to
create a "consolidated planning board," comparable statutes do
exist.138 However, these statutes clearly mark out the parame-
ters of a contract that two municipal corporations may enter
into. Some jurisdictions expressly denote the purpose of pro-
moting the health, safety, or welfare of the community.1 39
Others require extensive democratic checks on the municipal
decision to enter into an interlocal agreement or regional plan-
ning commission.1 40 All expressly lay out the powers, duties
and functions of their regional planning commissions,141 and
some provide for the voting, representation, appointment, or
terms of office procedures for their regional planning commis-
sions.1 42 Some even limit the role of their regional planning
commissions to that of a mere advisor.143
401 N.Y.S.2d 269, 271 (2d Dep't 1978). See also 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, NEW
YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.15 (3d ed. 1984).
137. Freihofer v. Lake George Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 137 A.D.2d 894, 524
N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dep't 1988).
138. Most jurisdictions either provide for the creation of a "regional planning
commission" or deal in one way or another with interlocal contracts. While their
wording is similar to the New York statutes, all other jurisdictions either severely
limit the power of these commissions or provide for rigid regulations in adopting
interlocal contracts.
139. See MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 2 (West 1994) ("to promote. . . the
general welfare and prosperity of their citizens.") Id.
140. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-31a (West 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 40B, § 3 (West 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 484-86 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 4802 (1992).
141. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65065.1 (West 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-
339b (West 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 5 (West 1994); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, §§ 4832, 4862 (1992).
142. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-339C, 7-339F (West 1989); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 4863 (1992).
143. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 5 (West 1994).
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New York's statutes, by omitting all these specific provi-
sions, have opened themselves up to a variety of interpreta-
tions. Because the common law in New York has always
recognized that private property rights are supreme, these stat-
utes should be interpreted as narrowly as possible.
New York courts have recognized that a municipality has
no extra-territorial jurisdiction. For instance, in Freihofer v.
Lake George Zoning Board of Appeals,144 the owner of a lake-
shore lot which was bisected by the boundary line of two towns
(Lake George and Queensbury), had applied to the zoning en-
forcement officer of one town for a permit to construct a single
family residence on the parcel located within the Town of Lake
George.145 The owner already had one single family residence
on the parcel located within Queensbury. The Lake George
Zoning Ordinance, however, permitted only one single family
residence to be built on each parcel.1 46 The Third Department
upheld the decision of the Zoning Board in granting the permit
to the owners for two relevant reasons. First, the Court held
that zoning laws are in derogation of common law property
rights and thus must be strictly construed, avoiding extension
by implication.1 47 Second, the Court held that a town may con-
sider abutting land in separate towns irrelevant in the determi-
nation of the property rights of their own citizens.1 48
If one were to read sections 20-g of the General City Law,149
284 of the Town Lawo50 and 7-741 of the Village Law' 5 ' as per-
mitting a municipality to abdicate its inherent right to regulate
its own land as it sees fit, the New York State Legislature would
have enacted statutes that are directly in conflict with the com-
mon law rights of the municipalities and their citizens. There-
fore, even if joint planning boards were held not to be per se
unconstitutional, the instant statutes, which are in derogation
of the common law right to develop one's property without inter-
ference from the government, must be read as limiting the pow-
144. 137 A.D.2d 894, 524 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dep't 1988).
145. Id. at 894, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
146. Id. at 894, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney Supp. 1996).
150. N.Y. ToWN LAw § 284 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
151. N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-741 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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ers of the joint planning board to an advisory role. As in
Freihofer, a town should not abridge its citizens' property rights
by giving greater weight to consideration of property which is
located outside its boundaries. The power of a joint planning
board should not be unconstitutionally extended so that it has
final decision-making authority.
Conclusion
Joint planning boards have no place in the exercise of land
use regulation. They are per se unconstitutional and violate no-
tions of due process and equal protection in regard to property
rights, voting rights, and home rule. The provisions of the Gen-
eral City Law, the Town Law, and the Village Law dealing with
intermunicipal cooperation merely serve to make matters worse
by granting broad and unlimited powers to these unconstitu-
tional, quasi-legislative entities. As a result, these statutes
must be struck down or, at the very least, the statutes should be
narrowly construed as granting joint planning boards advisory
power only.
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